INTRODUCTION
Space radiation in space systems presents unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission / orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions, and application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two primary types: the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD), and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects (SEE). Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wearout mechanisms on any active components in a system. Active EEE parts tend to be the most sensitive and life limited in space applications. This paper will focus on active EEE parts only. The radiation environment is mission dependent. A Low Earth Orbit will need to consider effects caused by trapped particles (protons and electrons) as well as the Galactic cosmic Ray environment and the solar environment; where as interstellar missions only need to include the Galactic cosmic Ray and solar environments. For details on the space environment, please see Janet Barth's NSREC Short Course on the radiation Environments [6] .
TID/DISPLACEMENT DAMAGE
Total Ionizing Dose and Displacement Damage can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU) and temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), and singleevent burnout (SEB). The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application-and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode.
For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible, to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component, design, and system engineers work together, preferably starting early in the program, to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to maximize the probability of mission success. In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU) and temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects, such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), and single-event burnout (SEB). The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend largely on their application-and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible, to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component, design and system engineers work together-preferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to Maximize the probability of mission success.
UNDERSTANDING THE DATASHEET
A typical radiation hardened microprocessor will say it was tested to some dose level in krad (Si) in accordance with MIL-STD-883 Method 1019. The krad (Si) is the amount of dose deposited in silicon and MIL-STD-883 Method 1019 is the industry standard. The data sheet will frequently give an error rate like E-5 error/device/day. This is a meaningless number. It will vary by the mission profile: a Low Earth orbit will have a much lower error rate than a Geostationary or interplanetary mission. The data sheet may also give a LET threshold of some number in MeV.cm2/mg; this is helpful it, along with the cross-section and device geometry, can be used to calculate the event rate for the specific mission. 
